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Abstract — The proven efficacy of learning-based control
schemes strongly motivates their application to robotic
systems operating in the physical world. However, guar-
anteeing correct operation during the learning process is
currently an unresolved issue, which is of vital importance
in safety-critical systems. We propose a general safety
framework based on Hamilton-Jacobi reachability methods
that can work in conjunction with an arbitrary learning algo-
rithm. The method exploits approximate knowledge of the
system dynamics to guarantee constraint satisfaction while
minimally interfering with the learning process. We further
introduce a Bayesian mechanism that refines the safety
analysis as the system acquires new evidence, reducing
initial conservativeness when appropriate while strength-
ening guarantees through real-time validation. The result
is a least-restrictive, safety-preserving control law that in-
tervenes only when (a) the computed safety guarantees
require it, or (b) confidence in the computed guarantees
decays in light of new observations. We prove theoretical
safety guarantees combining probabilistic and worst-case
analysis and demonstrate the proposed framework experi-
mentally on a quadrotor vehicle. Even though safety anal-
ysis is based on a simple point-mass model, the quadro-
tor successfully arrives at a suitable controller by policy-
gradient reinforcement learning without ever crashing, and
safely retracts away from a strong external disturbance
introduced during flight.
I. I NTRODUCTION
Learning-based methods in control and artificial intelligence
are generating a considerable amount of excitement in the
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In the last decade, learning-based control schemes have
been successfully demonstrated in robotics applications in
which the safety-critical aspects were effectively removed or
mitigated, typically by providing a manual fallback mechanism
or retrofitting the environment to allow safe failure. In [1], [10]
a trained pilot was able to remotely take over control of
the autonomous helicopter at any time; the power slide car
maneuvers in [27] were performed on an empty test track; and
the aerobatic quadrotor in [29] was enclosed in a safety net.
While mostly effective, these ad hoc methods tend to come
with their own issues (pilot handoffs, for instance, are notori-
ously prone to result in accidents [22]) and do not generalize
well beyond the context of the particular demonstration. It
therefore seems imperative to develop principled and provably
correct approaches to safety, attuned to the exploration-intense
needs of learning-based algorithms, that can be built into the
autonomous operation of learning robotic systems.
Current efforts in policy transfer learning propose training
an initial control policy in simulation and then carrying it over
to the physical system [9]. While progress in this direction is
likely to reduce overall training time, it does not eliminate
the risk of catastrophic system misbehavior. State-of-the art
neural network policies have been shown to be vulnerable to
small changes between training and testing conditions [23],
which inevitably arise between simulated and real systems.
Guaranteeing correct behavior of simulation-trained schemes
in the real world thus remains an important unsolved problem.
Providing guarantees about a system’s evolution inevitably
requires some form of knowledge about the causal mechanisms
that govern it. Fortunately, in practice it is never the case that
the designer of a robotic system has no knowledge whatsoever
of its dynamics: making use of approximate knowledge is
both possible and, we argue, advantageous for safety. Yet,
perfect knowledge of the dynamics can hardly if ever be safely
assumed either. This motivates searching for points of rap-
prochement between data-driven and model-based techniques.
We identify three key properties that we believe any general
safe learning framework should satisfy:
‚ High confidence. The framework should be able to keep
the system safe with high probability given the available
knowledge about the system and the environment.
‚ Modularity. The framework should work in conjunction
with an arbitrary learning-based control algorithm, with-
out requiring modifications to said algorithm.
‚ Minimal intervention. The framework should not in-
terfere with the learning process unless deemed strictly
necessary to ensure safety, and should return control to
the learning algorithm as soon as possible.
We can use these criteria to evaluate the strengths and
shortcomings of existing approaches to safety in intelligent
systems, and place our work in the context of prior research.
Related Work
Early proposals of safe learning date back to the turn of the
century. Lyapunov-based reinforcement learning [35] allowed
a learning agent to switch between a number of pre-computed
“base-level” controllers with desirable safety and performance
properties; this enabled solid theoretical guarantees at the
expense of substantially constraining the agent’s behavior; in
a similar spirit, later work has considered constraining policy
search to the space of stabilizing controllers [38].
In risk-sensitive reinforcement learning [17], the expected
return was heuristically weighted with the probability (risk) of
reaching an “error state”; while this allowed for more general
learning strategies, no guarantees could be derived from the
heuristic effort. Nonetheless, the ideal problem formulation
proposed in the paper, to maximize performance subject to
some maximum allowable risk, inspired later work (see [16]
for a survey) and is very much aligned with our own goals.
More recently, [33] proposed an ergodicity-based safe ex-
ploration policy for Markov decision processes (MDPs) with
uncertain transition measures, which imposed a constraint on
the probability, under the current belief, of being able to
return to the starting state. While practical online methods
for updating the system’s belief on the transition dynamics are
not discussed, and the toy grid-world demonstrations fall short
of capturing the criticality of dynamics in many real-world
safety problems, the probabilistic safety analysis is extremely
powerful, and our work certainly takes inspiration from it.
Recent safe exploration efforts in robotics concurrent with our
work use Gaussian processes to model uncertain dynamics,
but restrict safety analysis to local stability (i.e. region of
attraction) and do not consider state constraints [5], [6].
The robust model-predictive control approach in [3] learns
about system dynamics for performance only, while enforcing
constraints based on a robust nominal model. The method
was successfully demonstrated on problems with nontrivial
dynamics, including quadrotor flight. However, using an a
priori model for safety at best constrains the system’s ability
to explore, and at worst may fail to keep the real system safe.
To explicitly account for model uncertainty, the safety
problem can be studied as a differential game [30], in which
the controller must keep the system within the specified state
constraints (i.e. away from failure states) in spite of the actions
of an adversarial disturbance: the optimal solution to this
reachability game, obtainable through Hamilton-Jacobi meth-
ods [31], [34], has been used to guarantee safety in a variety
of engineering problems [13], [7], [21]. This robust, worst-
case analysis determines a safe region in the state space and a
control policy to remain inside it; a related approach involves
ensuring invariance through “barrier functions” [36], [41]. A
key advantage is that in the interior of this safe set one can
execute any desired action, as long as the safe control is
applied at the boundary: in this sense, the technique yields
a least-restrictive control law, which naturally lends itself
to minimally constrained learning-based control. Initial work
exploring this was presented in [19], [20].
The above methods are subject, however, to the fundamental
limitation of any model-based safety analysis, namely, the
contingency of all guarantees upon the validity of the model.
This faces designers with a difficult tradeoff. On the one
hand, if, in order to guarantee safety under large or poorly
understood uncertainty, they assume conservative bounds on
model error, this will reduce the computed safe set, and thereby
restrict the freedom of the learning algorithm. If, on the
other hand, the assumed bounds fail to fully capture the true
evolution of the state, the theoretical guarantees derived from
the model may not in fact apply to the real system.
Contribution
In this work we propose a novel general safety framework
that combines model-based control-theoretical analysis with
data-driven Bayesian inference to construct and maintain high-
probability guarantees around an arbitrary learning-based con-
trol algorithm. Drawing on Hamilton-Jacobi robust optimal
control techniques, it defines a least-restrictive supervisory
control law, which allows the system to freely execute its
learning-based policy almost everywhere, but imposes a com-
puted action at states where it is deemed critical for safety. The
safety analysis is refined through Bayesian inference in light
of newly gathered evidence, both avoiding excessive conser-
vativeness and improving reliability by rapidly imposing the
computed safe actions if confidence in model-based guarantees
decreases due to unexpected observations.
This paper consolidates the preliminary work presented in
[19], [20], [2], extending the theoretical results to provide a
unified treatment of model learning and guarantee validation,
and presenting significant novel experimental results. To our
knowledge this is the first work in the area of reachability
analysis that reasons online about the validity of computed
guarantees and uses a resilient mechanism to continue exploit-
ing them under inaccurate prior assumptions on model error.
Our framework relies on reachability analysis for the model-
based safety guarantees, and on Gaussian processes for the on-
line Bayesian analysis. It is important to acknowledge that both
of these techniques are computationally intensive and scale
poorly with the dimensionality of the underlying continuous
spaces, which can generally limit their applicability to complex
dynamical systems. However, recent compositional approaches
have dramatically increased the tractability of lightly coupled
high-dimensional systems [25], [24], [7], [8], while new ana-
lytic solutions entirely overcome the “curse of dimensionality”
in some relevant cases [12], [26]. The key contribution of this
work is in the principled methodology for incorporating safety
into learning-based systems: we thus focus our examples
on problems of low dimensionality, implicitly bypassing the
computational issues, and note that our method can readily be
used in conjunction with these decomposition techniques to
extend its application to more complex systems.
We demonstrate our method on a quadrotor vehicle learning
to track a vertical trajectory close to the ground (Fig. 1), using
a policy gradient algorithm [28]. The reliability of our method
is evidenced under uninformative policy initializations, inac-
curate safe set estimation and strong unmodeled disturbances.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section II we introduce the modeling framework and for-
mally state the safe learning problem. Section III presents
the differential game analysis and derives some important
properties. The proposed methodology is described in Section
IV with the proofs of its fundamental guarantees, as well
as a computationally tractable alternative with weaker, but
practically useful, properties. Lastly, in Section V we present
the experimental results.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model and State-Dependent Uncertainty
The analysis in this paper considers a fully observable
system whose underlying dynamics are assumed deterministic,
but only partially known. This modeling framework can in
practice be applied to a wide range of systems for which an
approximate dynamic model is available but the exact behavior
is hard to model a priori (due to manufacturing tolerances,
aerodynamic effects, uncertain environments, etc.).
We can formalize this as a dynamical system with state
x P Rn, and two inputs, u P U Ă Rnu , d P D Ă Rnd (with U
and D compact) which we will refer to as the controller and
the disturbance:
9x “ fpx, u, dq. (1)
In this context, however, d is thought of as a deterministic
state-dependent disturbance capturing unmodeled dynamics,
given by an unknown Lipschitz function d : Rn Ñ D. That
is, we could in principle write the unknown dynamics as
F px, uq “ f`x, u, dpxq˘. Unlike F , f is a known function,
with all uncertainty captured by dp¨q. The flow field f :
Rn ˆ U ˆ D Ñ Rn is assumed uniformly continuous and
bounded, as well as Lipschitz in x and d for all u: this ensures
that the unknown dynamics F are Lipschitz in x.
Letting U and D denote the collections of measurable1
functions u : r0,8q Ñ U and d : r0,8q Ñ D respectively,
and allowing the controller and disturbance to choose any such
signals, the evolution of the system from any initial state x is
determined (see for example [11], Ch. 2, Theorems 1.1, 2.1)
by the unique continuous trajectory ξ : r0,8q Ñ Rn solving
9ξpsq “ fpξpsq,upsq,dpsqq, a.e. s ě 0,
ξp0q “ x. (2)
Note that this is a solution in Carathe´odory’s extended sense,
that is, it satisfies the differential equation almost everywhere
(i.e. except on a subset of Lebesgue measure zero).
Since dpxq is unknown, we attempt to bound it at each state
by a compact set Dˆpxq Ď D, which is allowed to vary in the
state space. In Section III, we present a robust, least-restrictive
safety control law that enforces constraint satisfaction subject
to dpxq P Dˆpxq. In Section IV, we present a Bayesian
approach to find a bound Dˆpxq based on a Gaussian process
model of dpxq. Our overall approach therefore combines robust
(worst-case) guarantees with Bayesian (probabilistic) analysis,
by constructing the disturbance bound to reflect the local
uncertainty around the inferred disturbance function.2
Any model-based safety guarantees for the system will
require that the bound Dˆpxq correctly captures the unknown
1A function f : X Ñ Y between two measurable spaces pX,ΣXq and
pY,ΣY q is said to be measurable if the preimage of a measurable set in Y
is a measurable set in X , that is: @V P ΣY , f´1pV q P ΣX , with ΣX ,ΣY
σ-algebras on X ,Y .
2 Alternative methods to providing the disturbance bounds (for example,
a conservative a priori estimate, or a system identification procedure) are
possible, provided some basic conditions to ensure that the dynamical system
resulting from (2) with the restriction d P Dˆpxq remains well defined. For the
interested reader, sufficient conditions on Dˆpxq are discussed in the Appendix.
part of the dynamics given by dpxq, at least at some critical set
of states x (discussed in Section III). One key insight in this
work is that the system should take action to ensure safety
not only when the model predicts that this action may be
necessary, but also when the system detects that the model
itself may become unreliable in the predictable future.
We state here a preliminary result that will be useful later on
in the paper, and introduce the notion of local model reliability.
Proposition 1: If dpxq P int Dˆpxq and the set-valued
map Dˆ : Rn Ñ 2D is Lipschitz-continuous under the
Hausdorff metric3, then there exists ∆t ą 0 such that all
possible trajectories followed by the system starting at x
will satisfy d
`
ξpτq˘ P Dˆ`ξpτq˘ for all τ P rt, t ` ∆ts.
Proof: Let LDˆ be the Lipschitz (Hausdorff) constant of
Dˆ, Ld the Lipschitz constant of d, and Cf a norm bound
on the dynamics f . We then have that over an arbitrary
time interval rt, t ` ∆ts, regardless of the control and
disturbance signals up¨q, dp¨q, any system trajectory starting
at ξptq “ x satisfies |ξpτq ´ x| ď Cf∆t,@τ P rt, t`∆ts.
This implies both |dpξpτqq ´ dpxq| ď LdCf∆t and
dH
`Dˆpξpτqq, Dˆpxq˘ ď LDˆCf∆t. Requiring that the open ball
B
`
dpxq, pLd ` LDˆqCf∆t
˘
be contained in Dˆpxq ensures
dpξpτqq P Dˆpξpτqq. Since dpxq P int Dˆpxq, there must exist a
small enough ∆t ą 0 for which this condition is met.
We can further quantify this ∆t through the signed distance4
to Dˆpxq at the current dpxq.
Corollary 1: If the Lipschitz constants are known, then
dpxq P int Dˆpxq implies dpξpτqq P Dˆpξpτqq for all times
τ P rt, t`∆ts, with
∆t “ ´sDˆpxq
`
dpxq˘
pLd ` LDˆqCf
.
The disturbance bounds Dˆ derived in this paper satisfy the
hypothesis of Proposition 1 (see Appendix for details), and we
thus refer to the condition dpxq P int Dˆpxq as the model being
locally reliable at x.
Finally, we assume that the effect of the disturbance on
the dynamics is independent of the action applied by the
controller.
9x “ f`x, u, dpxq˘ “ g`x, u˘` h`dpxq˘. (3)
with g : Rn ˆ Rnu Ñ Rn, h : Rnp Ñ Rn, where g, and
h inherit Lipschitz continuity in their first argument from f
and h is injective onto its image. This decoupling assumption,
made for ease of exposition, is not strictly necessary, and the
theoretical results in this paper can be easily adapted to the
coupled case.
Throughout our analysis, we will use the notation ξu,d
x,Dˆp¨q to
denote the state trajectory t ÞÑ x corresponding to the initial
condition x P Rn, the control signal u P U and the disturbance
signal d P D, subjecting the latter to satisfy dptq P Dˆ`ξu,d
x,Dˆptq
˘
for all t ě 0.
3The Hausdorff metric (or Hausdorff distance) between any
two sets A and B in a metric space pM,dM q is defined as
dHpA,Bq “ maxt supaPA infbPB dM pa, bq, supbPB infaPA dM pa, bq u.
4 For any nonempty set M Ă Rm, the signed distance function
sM : Rm Ñ R is defined as infyPM |z ´ y| for points z P RmzM and
´ infyPRmzM |z´ y| for points z PM, where | ¨ | denotes a norm on Rm.
B. State Constraints
A central element in our problem is the constraint set, which
defines a region K Ď Rn of the state space, typically the com-
plement of all unacceptable failure states, where the system is
required to remain throughout the learning process. This set
is assumed closed and time-invariant; no further assumptions
(boundedness, connectedness, convexity, etc.) are needed.
From closedness, we can implicitly characterize K as the
zero superlevel set of a Lipschitz surface function l : Rn Ñ R:
x P K ðñ lpxq ě 0. (4)
This function always exists, since we can simply choose
lpxq “ ´sKpxq, which is Lipschitz continuous by definition.
To express whether a given trajectory ever violates the
constraints, let the functional V : Rn ˆ UˆDÑ R assign to
each initial state x and input signals up¨q, dp¨q the lowest value
of lp¨q achieved by trajectory ξu,d
x,Dˆp¨q over all times t ě 0:
V`x,up¨q,dp¨q˘ :“ inf
tě0 l
`
ξu,d
x,Dˆptq
˘
. (5)
This outcome V will be strictly smaller than zero if there exists
any t P r0,8q at which the trajectory leaves the constraint set,
and will be nonnegative if the system remains in the constraint
set for all of t ě 0. Denoting Vu,dpxq “ V`x,up¨q,dp¨q˘, the
following statement follows from (4) and (5) by construction.
Proposition 2: The set of points x from which the system
trajectory ξu,d
x,Dˆp¨q under given inputs up¨q P U,dp¨q P D will
remain in the constraint set K at all times t ě 0 is equal to
the zero superlevel set of Vu,dp¨q:
tx P Rn : @t ě 0, ξu,d
x,Dˆptq P Ku “ tx P Rn : Vu,dp¨q ě 0u.
Guaranteeing safe evolution from a given point x P Rn
given an uncertainty bound Dˆ requires determining whether
there exists a control input up¨q P U such that, for all
disturbance inputs dp¨q P D satisfying dptq P Dˆ`ξu,d
x,Dˆptq
˘
,
the evolution of the system remains in K, or equivalently
Vu,dpxq ě 0. In Section III, we review how to answer
this question using differential game theory and state some
important properties of the associated solution.
C. Objective: Safe Learning
Learning-based control aims to achieve desirable system
behavior by autonomously improving a policy κl : Rn Ñ U ,
typically seeking to optimize an objective function. Safe
learning additionally requires that certain constraints K re-
main satisfied while searching for such a policy. With full
knowledge of the system dynamics F px, uq “ f`x, u, dpxq˘,
we would like to find a safe control policy κ˚ : Rn Ñ U
producing trajectories ξptq P K, @t ě 0, for the largest set of
initial states x “ ξp0q, then restrict any learned policy so that
κlpxq “ κ˚pxq wherever required to ensure safety. When dpxq
is not known exactly, however, this problem cannot be solved.
Instead, given an estimated disturbance set Dˆpxq, we can
find an inner approximation of the set of safe states by
considering all the possible trajectories that can be produced
under the bounded uncertainty dpxq P Dˆpxq. Our goal, then,
is to find the set of robustly safe states x for which there
exists a control policy κ˚ that can keep the closed-loop system
evolution in K, and consistently limit κl to ensure that κ˚ is
applied when necessary. To formally state this, we introduce
an important notion from robust control theory.
Definition 1: A subset M Ă Rn is a robust con-
trolled invariant set under uncertain dynamics 9x “ fpx, u, dq,
d P Dˆpxq, if there exists a feedback control policy κ : Rn Ñ U
such that all possible system trajectories starting at ξp0q PM
are guaranteed to satisfy ξptq PM for all time t ě 0.
Given that trajectories are continuous, the system state can
only leave M by crossing its boundary BM. Hence if M
is closed, applying the feedback policy κpxq for x P BM is
enough to render M robust controlled invariant, allowing an
arbitrary control action to be applied in the interior of M.
Definition 2: The safe set ΩDˆ is the maximal robust con-
trolled invariant set under uncertain dynamics 9x “ fpx, u, dq,
d P Dˆpxq, that is contained in the constraint set K.
Success in safe learning therefore seems closely linked to
model uncertainty: a tighter bound Dˆpxq on dpxq yields a less
conservative safe set ΩDˆ, which in turn reduces the restrictions
on the learning process. However, an estimated bound that fails
to fully capture dpxq may allow the system to execute control
actions resulting in a constraint violation. The disturbance
bound should thus be as tight as possible, to allow the system
greater freedom in learning, yet wide enough to confidently
capture the unknown dynamics, in order to ensure safety.
In the following two sections, we formalize this tradeoff
and propose a framework to reason about safety guarantees
under uncertainty. Section III poses the safety problem as a
differential game between the controller and an adversarial
disturbance, presenting a stronger result than commonly used
in the reachability safety literature, which exploits the entire
value function of the game rather than only its zero level
set. Section IV leverages this result to provide a principled
approach to global safety under model uncertainty, as well as
a fast local alternative that may often be useful in practice.
III. SAFETY AS A DIFFERENTIAL GAME
The safety problem can be posed as a two-player zero-
sum differential game between the system controller and the
disturbance. Intuitively, we are requiring the controller to keep
the system from violating the constraints for all possible dis-
turbance inputs within a certain family: by conducting a worst-
case analysis assuming an optimally adversarial disturbance,
we implicitly protect the system against all “suboptimal”
disturbances as well. We first introduce relevant background
on differential games, and then present new enabling insights.
A. Background: HJI Equation and Safe Set
To obtain a safe set and an associated safety policy, we
formulate a game whose outcome is given by the functional
V`x,up¨q,dp¨q˘ introduced in (5), negative for those trajecto-
ries ξu,d
x,Dˆp¨q that at some point violate the constraints K.
In the robust safety problem, the controller seeks to max-
imize the outcome of the game, while the disturbance tries
to minimize it: that is, the disturbance is trying to drive the
system out of the constraint set, and the controller wants to
prevent it from succeeding. Following [14], we define the set
of nonanticipative strategies for the disturbance containing the
functionals B “ tβ : U Ñ D | @t ě 0, @up¨q, uˆp¨q P U,`
upτq“ uˆpτq a.e.τ ě 0˘ ñ `βruspτq“βruˆspτq a.e.τ ě 0˘u.
Since the disturbance and the control inputs are decoupled in
the system dynamics, Isaacs’ minimax condition holds5 and
the value of the game is well defined as:
V pxq :“ inf
βrusp¨qPB
sup
up¨qPU
V`x,up¨q,βrusp¨q˘ . (6)
Under this information structure, we draw on the (infinite-
horizon) discriminating kernel concept from viability theory.
Definition 3: A point x P K is in K’s discriminating kernel
DiscDˆpKq if the system trajectory ξu,dx,Dˆ starting at x, with
both players acting optimally, remains in K for all time t ě 0:
DiscDˆpKq :“ tx P Rn : @βp¨q P B, Dup¨q P U ,
@t ě 0, ξu,βrus
x,Dˆ ptq P Ku .
The following classical result follows from Proposition 2.
Proposition 3: The discriminating kernel of the constraint
set K is the zero superlevel set of the value function V :
DiscDˆpKq “ tx P Rn : V pxq ě 0u.
Further, from Definitions 2 and 3, it can be seen that the
discriminating kernel DiscDˆpKq is identical to the safe set ΩDˆ.
It has been shown that the value function for minimum
payoff games of the form presented in Section III-A (i.e.
games in which the payoff is the minimum of a state function
over time) can be characterized as the unique viscosity solution
to a variational inequality involving an appropriate Hamilto-
nian [4], [15]; an alternative formulation involves a modified
partial differential equation [30]. In a finite-horizon setting,
with the game taking place over the compact time interval
r0, T s, the value function V px, tq can be computed by solving
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) variational inequality:
min
#
lpxq´V px, tq, BVBt px, tq`maxuPU mindPDˆpxq
BV
Bx px, tqfpx, u, dq
+
(7a)
V px, T q “ lpxq. (7b)
As long as there exists a nonempty safe set in the problem,
V px, tq becomes independent of t inside of this set as T Ñ8.
We accordingly drop the dependence on t and recover V pxq
as defined in (6), which we refer to as the safety function.
Definition 4: The optimal safe policy κ˚p¨q is the solution
to the optimization:6
κ˚pxq “ arg max
uPU mindPDˆpxq
BV
Bx pxqfpx, u, dq.
Policy κ˚pxq attempts to drive the system to the safest possible
state always assuming an adversarial disturbance. If the distur-
bance bound Dˆpxq is correct everywhere, then one can allow
the system to execute any desired control while in the interior
of ΩDˆ, as long as the safety preserving action κ
˚pxq is taken
5This means that we could have alternatively let the controller use nonan-
ticipative strategies, without affecting the solution of the game.
6 While in general the solution need not be unique, we can always choose
one element of the arg max set arbitrarily. Therefore we will assume for
simplicity a policy κ˚ : Rn Ñ U uniquely mapping states to control inputs.
whenever the state reaches the boundary BΩDˆ; the system is
then guaranteed to remain inside ΩDˆ for all time. This least-
restrictive control law can be used in conjunction with an
arbitrary learning-based control policy κlpxq (which may be
repeatedly updated by the corresponding learning algorithm),
to produce a safe learning policy:
κpxq “
#
κlpxq, if V pxq ą 0,
κ˚pxq, otherwise. (8)
Rather than imposing the optimal safe action κ˚pxq, it
would have, in principle, been sufficient to project the desired
κlpxq onto the set of control inputs that guarantee nonnegative
local evolution of V for all d P Dˆpxq. However, κ˚pxq results
in the greatest predicted increase in value, which is desirable
under model uncertainty, as we will see in Section IV-C.
B. Invariance Properties of Level Sets
Traditionally, the implicit hypothesis made to guarantee
safety using a least-restrictive law in the form of (8) has been
correctness of the estimated disturbance bound Dˆ everywhere
in the state space, (i.e. dpxq P Dˆpxq @x P Rn), or at
least everywhere in the constraint set K [30], [20]. We will
now argue that the necessary hypothesis for safety is in fact
much less stringent, by proving an important result that we
will use in the following section to strengthen the proposed
safety framework and retain safety guarantees under partially
incorrect models.
Proposition 4: Any nonnegative superlevel set of V pxq is
a robust controlled invariant set with respect to d P Dˆpxq.
Proof: By Lipschitz continuity of f and l, we have that
V is Lipschitz continuous [14] and hence, by Rademacher’s
theorem, almost everywhere differentiable. The convergence
of V px, tq to V pxq as T Ñ 8 implies that at the limit
BV
Bt px, tq “ 0. Therefore, given any α ě 0, for any point
x P tx | V pxq ě αu there must exist a control action u˚
such that @d P Dˆpxq, BVBx pxqfpx, u˚, dq ě 0; otherwise the
right hand side of (7a) would be strictly negative for T Ñ8,
contradicting convergence. Then, the value of V from any such
state x can always be kept from decreasing, so tx|V pxq ě αu
is a robust controlled invariant set with respect to d P Dˆpxq.
Proposition 5: Consider two disturbance sets D1pxq and
D2pxq, and a closed set M Ă Rn that is robustly controlled
invariant under D1pxq. If D2pxq Ď D1pxq @x P BM, then M
is robustly controlled invariant also under D2pxq.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary trajectory ξu,dx0,D2 P XD2
under the disturbance set D2pxq, starting at x0 P M, such
that for some τ ă 8, ξpτq R M. Since trajectories in XD2
are continuous, there must then exist s P rt0, τ s such that
ξu,dx0,D2psq P BM. On the other hand, because M is robustly
controlled invariant under D1pxq, we know that Dκ : Rn Ñ U
such that no possible disturbance d P D1pxq can drive the
system out of M. Since D2pxq Ď D1pxq @x P BM, the
same control policy κ˚pxq on the boundary guarantees that
no disturbance d P D2pxq Ď D1pxq can drive the system out
of M. Hence, for ξu,dx0,D2 , switching to policy κ at time s
guarantees that the system will remain in M. Therefore M is
a robust controlled invariant set under D2pxq.
Corollary 2: Let Qα “ tx P Rn : V pxq “ αu with
α ě 0 be any nonnegative level set of the safety function
V , computed for some disturbance set Dˆpxq. If dpxq P Dˆpxq
@x P Qα, then the superlevel set tx P Rn : V pxq ě αu is an
invariant set under the computed safe control policy κ˚pxq.
This corollary, which follows from Propositions 4 and 5 by
considering the singleton tdpxqu, is an important result that
will be at the core of our data-driven safety enhancement.
It provides a sufficient condition for safety, but unlike the
standard HJI solution, it does not readily prescribe a least-
restrictive control law to exploit it: how should one determine
what candidate α ě 0 to choose, or whether a valid Qα exists
at all? Deciding when the safe controller should intervene
and what guarantees are possible is nontrivial and requires
additional analysis.
The next section proposes a Bayesian approach enabling the
safety controller to reason about its confidence in the model-
based guarantees described in this section. If this confidence
reaches a prescribed minimum value in light of the observed
data, the controller can intervene early to ensure that safety
will be maintained with high probability.
IV. BAYESIAN SAFETY ANALYSIS
A. Learning-Based Safe Learning
As we have seen, robust optimal control and dynamic game
theory provide powerful analytical tools to study the safety of
a dynamical model. However, it is important to realize that
the applicability of any theoretically derived guarantee to the
real system is contingent upon the validity of the underlying
modeling assumptions; in the formulation considered here,
this amounts to the state disturbance function dpxq being
captured by the bound Dˆpxq on at least a certain subset
of the state space. The system designer therefore faces an
inevitable tradeoff between risk and conservativeness, due to
the impossibility of accounting for every aspect of the real
system in a tractable model.
In many cases, choosing a parametric model a priori forces
one to become overly conservative in order to ensure that the
system behavior will be adequately captured: this results in a
large bound Dˆpxq on the disturbance, which typically leads
to a small safe set ΩDˆ, limiting the learning agent’s ability
to explore and perform the assigned tasks. In other cases,
insufficient caution in the definition of the model can lead
to an estimated disturbance set Dˆpxq that fails to contain the
actual model error dpxq, and therefore the computed safe set
ΩDˆ may not in fact be controlled invariant in practice, which
can end all safety guarantees.
In order to avoid excessive conservativeness and keep the-
oretical guarantees valid, it is imperative to have both a prin-
cipled method to refine the system model based on acquired
measurements and a reliable mechanism to detect and react to
model discrepancies with the real system’s behavior; both of
these elements are necessarily data-driven. We thus arrive at
what is perhaps the most important insight in this work: the
relation between safety and learning is reciprocal. Not only is
safety a key requirement for learning in autonomous systems:
learning about the real system’s behavior is itself indispensable
to provide practical safety guarantees.
In the remainder of this section we propose a method
for reasoning about the uncertain system dynamics, using
Gaussian processes to regularly update the model used for
safety analysis, and introduce a Bayesian approach for online
validation of model-based guarantees in between updates. We
then define an adaptive safety control strategy based on this
real-time validation, which leverages the theoretical results
from Hamilton-Jacobi analysis to provide stronger guarantees
for safe learning under possible model inaccuracies.
B. Gaussian Process
To estimate the disturbance function dpxq over the state
space, we model it as being drawn from a Gaussian process.
Gaussian processes are a powerful abstraction that extends
multivariate Gaussian regression to the infinite-dimensional
space of functions, allowing Bayesian inference based on
(possibly noisy) observations of a function’s value at finitely
many points.7
A Gaussian process is a random process or field defined
by a mean function µ : Rn Ñ R and a positive semidefinite
covariance kernel function k : Rn ˆ Rn Ñ R. We will treat
each component dj , j P t1, ..., ndu, of the disturbance function
as an independent Gaussian process:
djpxq „ GPpµjpxq, kjpx, x1qq. (9)
A defining characteristic of a Gaussian process is that the
marginal probability distribution of the function value at any
finite number of points is a multivariate Gaussian. This will
allow us to obtain the disturbance bound Dˆpxq as a Cartesian
product of confidence intervals for the components of dpxq at
each state x, choosing the bound to capture a desired degree
of confidence.8
Gaussian processes allow incorporating new observations
in a nonparametric Bayesian setting. First, assume a prior
Gaussian process distribution over the j-th component of dp¨q,
with mean µjp¨q and covariance kernel kjp¨, ¨q. The class of the
prior mean function and covariance kernel function is chosen
to capture the characteristics of the model (linearity, period-
icity, etc), and is associated to a set of hyperparameters θp.
These are typically set to maximize the marginal likelihood of
an available set of training data, or possibly to reflect some
prior belief about the system.
Next, consider N measurements dˆj “ rdˆj1, . . . , dˆjN s, ob-
served with independent Gaussian noise ji „ N p0, pσjnq2q at
the points X “ rx1, . . . , xN s, i.e. dˆji “ djpxiq`ji . Combined
with the prior distribution (9), this new evidence induces a
Gaussian process posterior; in particular, the value of dj at
7 We give here an overview of Gaussian process regression and direct the
interested reader to [37] for a more comprehensive introduction.
8 By assuming independence of disturbance components we are effectively
over-approximating the confidence ellipsoid in Rnd by its minimal containing
box; a less conservative analysis could compute Dˆpxq using a vector-valued
Gaussian process model, at the expense of heavier computation.
finitely many points X˚ is distributed as a multivariate normal:
ErdjpX˚q | dˆj , Xs “ (10a)
µjpX˚q `KjpX˚, XqpKjpX,Xq ` pσjnq2Iq´1pdˆj ´ µjpXqq,
covrdjpX˚q | Xs “ (10b)
KjpX˚, X˚q ´KjpX˚, XqpKjpX,Xq ` pσjnq2Iq´1KjpX,X˚q,
where dji pXq “ djpxiq, µji pXq “ µjpxiq, and for any
X,X 1 the matrix KjpX,X 1q is defined component-wise as
KjikpX,X 1q “ kjpxi, x1kq. Note that whenever a new batch
of data X is obtained the hyperparameters of the kernel
function are refitted, so the variance implicitly depends on
the measurements dj . If a single query point is considered,
i.e. X˚ “ tx˚u, the marginalized Gaussian process posterior
becomes a univariate normal distribution quantifying both the
expected value of the disturbance function, d¯jpx˚q, and the
uncertainty of this estimate,
`
σjpx˚q
˘2
,
d¯jpx˚q “ Erdjpx˚q|dˆj , Xs (11a)`
σjpx˚q
˘2 “ covrdjpx˚q|Xs . (11b)
We can use the Bayesian machinery of Gaussian process
regression to compute a likely bound Dˆpxq on the disturbance
function dpxq based on the history of commanded inputs ui
and state measurements xi, i P t1, ..., Nu. To this effect, we
assume that a method for approximately measuring the state
derivatives is available (e.g. by numerical differentiation), and
denote each of these measurements by fˆi. Based on (3), we
can obtain measurements of dpxiq from the residuals between
the observed dynamics and the model’s prediction:
dˆpxiq “ h´1
´
fˆi ´ g
`
xi, ui
˘¯
. (12)
The residuals dˆ “ rdˆpx1q, . . . , dˆpxN qs are processed through
(10) to infer the marginal distribution of dpx˚q for an arbitrary
point x˚, specified by the expected value d¯jpx˚q and the stan-
dard deviation σjpx˚q of each component of the disturbance.
This distribution can be used to construct a disturbance set
Dˆpx˚q Ď D at any point x˚; in practice, this will be done at
finitely many points xi on a grid, and used in the numerical
reachability computation to obtain the safety function and the
safe control policy.
We now introduce the design parameter p as the desired
marginal probability that the disturbance function dpxq will
belong to the bound Dˆpxq at each point x; typically, p should
be chosen to be close to 1. The set Dˆpxq is then chosen for
each x as follows. Let z “ ?2 erf´1pp1{ndq, where erfp¨q
denotes the Gauss error function; that is, define z so that the
probability that a sample from a standard normal distribution
N p0, 1q lies within r´z, zs is p1{nd . We construct Dˆpxq by
taking a Cartesian product of confidence intervals:
Dˆpxq “
ndź
j“1
rd¯jpxq ´ zσjpxq, d¯jpxq ` zσjpxqs. (13)
Since each component djpxq is given by an independent Gaus-
sian N `d¯jpxq, σjpxq˘, the probability of dpxq lying within the
above hyperrectangle is by construction
`
p1{nd
˘nd “ p.
Remark 1: It is commonplace to use Gaussian distributions
to capture beliefs on variables that are otherwise known to be
bounded. While one might object that the unbounded support
of (11) contradicts our problem formulation (in which the
disturbance d took values from some compact set D Ă Rnd ),
the hyperrectangle Dˆpxq in (13) is always a compact set. Note
that the theoretical input set D is never needed in practice, so
it can always be assumed to contain Dˆpxq for all x.
Under Lipschitz continuous prior means µj and covariance
kernels kj , the disturbance bound (13) varies (Hausdorff)
Lipschitz-continuously in x, satisfying the hypotheses of
Proposition 1. This is formalized and proved in the Appendix.
The safety analysis described in Section III can be carried
out by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi equation (7) for Dˆpxq
given by (13), which—based on the information available at
the time of computation—will be a correct disturbance bound
at any single state x with probability p. As the system goes on
to gather new information, however, the posterior probability
for dpxq P Dˆpxq will change at each x (and will typically no
longer equal p). More generally, we have the following result.
Proposition 6: Let q be the probability that dpxq P Dˆpxq
for some state x with V pxq ě 0. Then the probability that
L˚fV pxq :“ DxV pxq ¨ f px, κ˚pxq, dpxqq ě 0 is at least q.
Proof: Omitting x for conciseness, we have: P pL˚fV ě 0q “
P
`
L˚fV ě0|d P Dˆ
˘
P
`
d P Dˆ˘`P `L˚fV ě0|d R Dˆ˘P `d R Dˆ˘.
By Corollary 2, the first term evaluates to 1 ¨ q; the second
term is nonnegative (and will typically be positive, since not
all values of d R Dˆ will be unfavorable for safety, and there
may be some for which the input κ˚pxq leads the system to
locally increase V ).
Based on this result, we can begin to reason about the
guarantees of the reachability analysis applied to the real
system in a Bayesian framework, inherited from the Gaussian
process model.
C. Online Safety Guarantee Validation
In order to ensure safety under the possibility of model
mismatch with the real system, it may become necessary to
intervene not only on the boundary of the computed safe
set, but also whenever the observed evolution of the system
indicates that the model-based safety guarantees may lose
validity. Indeed, failure to take a safe action in time may lead
to complete loss of guarantees if the system enters a region
of the state space where the model is consistently incorrect.
While the estimated bound Dˆ (Section IV-B) and the
associated safety guarantees (Section III) should certainly be
recomputed as frequently as possible in light of new evidence,
this process can typically take seconds or minutes, and in some
cases may even require offline computation. This motivates the
need to augment model-based guarantees through an online
data-driven mechanism to quickly adapt to new incoming
informationeven as new, improved guarantees are computed.
Bayesian analysis allows us to update our belief on the
disturbance function as new observations are obtained. This
in turn can be used to provide a probabilistic guarantee on
the validity of the safety results obtained from the robust
dynamical model generated from the older observations. In the
remainder of this section, we will discuss how to update the be-
lief on the disturbance function, and then provide two different
theoretical criteria for safety intervention. The first criterion
provides global probabilistic guarantees, but has computational
challenges associated to its practical implementation. The
alternative method only provides a local guarantee, but can
more easily be applied in real time.
Let us denote Xold and dˆ
j
old as the evidence used in
computing the disturbance set Dˆpxq, and Xnew and dˆjnew
as the evidence acquired online after the disturbance set is
computed. Conditioned on the old evidence, the function djpxq
is normally distributed with mean and variance given by (10)
with X “ Xold and dˆj “ dˆjold, and the disturbance set is
given by (13). If we also condition on the new evidence and
keep the hyperparameters fixed, then the mean and variance
are updated by modifying (10) with X “ rXold, Xnews and
dˆj “ rdˆjold, dˆjnews.
Remark 2: Performing the update requires inverting
KjprXold, Xnews, rXold, Xnewsq. This can be done efficiently
employing standard techniques: since KjpXold, Xoldq has
already been inverted (in order to compute the disturbance
bound Dˆ), all that is needed is inverting the Schur Complement
of KjpXold, Xoldq in KjprXold, Xnews, rXold, Xnewsq, which
has the same size as KjpXnew, Xnewq.
Ideally we would incorporate Xnew and dˆ
j
new to relearn the
Gaussian process hyperparameters as quickly as new measure-
ments come in: otherwise new measured disturbance values
dˆjnew will only affect the posterior mean, with the variance
depending exclusively on where the measurements were made
(Xnew). However, performing this update online is computa-
tionally prohibitive. Instead, we update the hyperparameters
every time a new estimated bound Dˆ is produced for safety
analysis, keeping them fixed in between. In practice the set
Xold will be much larger than Xnew, so the estimated hyper-
parameters would not be expected to change significantly.
Remark 3: In settings where conditions are slowly time-
varying, it may be desirable to give recently observed data
more weight than older observations. This can naturally be
encoded by the Gaussian process by appending time as an
additional dimension in X: points that are distant in time
would then be more weakly correlated, analogous to space.
Based on the new Gaussian distribution, we can reason
about the posterior confidence in the safety guarantees pro-
duced by our original safety analysis, which relied on the
prior Gaussian distribution resulting from measurements dˆjold
at states Xold.
1) Global Bayesian safety analysis: The strongest result
available for guaranteeing safety under the present frame-
work is Corollary 2, which allows the system to exploit any
superzero level set Qα (α ě 0) of the safety function V
throughout which the model is locally correct; all that is
needed is for such a Qα to exist for α P r0, V pxqs given
the current state x.
It is possible to devise a safety policy to fully exploit
the sufficient condition in Corollary 2 in a Bayesian setting:
if the posterior probability that the corollary’s hypotheses
will hold drops to some arbitrary global confidence threshold
γ0, the safe controller can override the learning agent. With
probability γ0, the corollary will still apply, in which case
the system is guaranteed to remain safe for all time; even if
Corollary 2 does not apply at this time (which could happen
with probability 1´γ0), it is still possible that the disturbance
dpxq will not consistently take adversarial values that force
the computed safety function V pxq to decrease, in which
case the system may still evolve safely. Therefore, this policy
guarantees a lower bound on the probability of maintaining
safety for all time.
In order to apply this safety criterion, the system needs to
maintain a Bayesian posterior of the sufficient condition in
Corollary 2. We refer to this posterior probability as the global
safety confidence γpx;X, dˆjq, or γpxq for conciseness:
γpx;X, dˆjq :“ P `Dα P r0, V pxqs,@x P Qα : dpxq P Dˆpxq|X, dˆj˘.
(14)
Based on this, we propose the least-restrictive control law:
κpxq “
#
κlpxq, if
`
γpxq ą γ0
˘^ `V pxq ą 0˘,
κ˚pxq, otherwise, (15)
so the system applies any action it desires if the global
safety confidence is above the threshold, but applies the safe
controller once this is no longer the case.
Note that if confidence in the safety guarantees is restored
after applying the safety action the learning algorithm will be
allowed to resume control of the system. This can happen by
multiple mechanisms: moving to a region with higher V pxq
will tend to increase the probability that some lower level
set may satisfy the hypotheses of Corollary 2; moving to a
region with less inconsistency between expected and observed
dynamics will typically lead to higher posterior belief that
nearby level sets will satisfy the hypotheses of Corollary 2;
and generally acquiring new data may, in some cases, increase
the posterior confidence that Corollary 2 may apply.
Computing the joint probability that the bound Dˆpxq cap-
tures the Gaussian process dpxq everywhere on a level set Qα
is not possible, since the set of functions dpxq satisfying this
condition is bounded on uncountably many dimensions, and
thus not measurable in function space. Similarly, evaluating
the joint probability for a continuum of level sets Qα for
α P r0, V pxqs is not feasible. Instead, exploiting the Lipschitz
assumption on dpxq, we can obtain the sought probability γpxq
from a marginal distribution over a sufficiently dense set of
sample points on each Qα and a sufficiently dense collection
of level sets between 0 and V pxq.
We can then use numerical methods [18] to compute the
multivariate normal cumulative distribution function and esti-
mate the marginal probability (using compact logic notation):
γpxq « P
ˆ Sł
s“1
Iľ
i“1
dpxs,iq P Dˆpxs,iq
˙
, (16)
over S level sets 0 “ α0 ă ... ă αS “ V pxq and I sample
points from each level set Qαs . As the density of samples
increases with larger S and I , the marginal probability (16)
asymptotically approaches the Gaussian process probability
(14). Unfortunately, however, current numerical methods can
only efficiently approximate these probabilities for multivariate
Gaussians of about 25 dimensions [18], which drastically
limits the number of sample points (S ˆ I « 25) that the
marginal probability can be evaluated over, making it difficult
to obtain a useful estimate. In view of this, a viable approach
may be to bound (14) below as follows:
γpxq ě γpxq :“ max
αPr0,V pxqs
P
`@x P Qα : dpxq P Dˆpxq˘, (17)
and approximately compute this as
γpxq « max
sPt1,...,Su
P
ˆ Iľ
i“1
dpxs,iq P Dˆpxs,iq
˙
, (18)
with the advantage that a separate multivariate Gaussian
evaluation can be done now for each level set (I « 25).
Computing this approximate probability as the system explores
its state space provides a decision mechanism to guarantee safe
operation of the system with a desired degree of confidence,
which the system designer or operator can adjust through the
γ0 parameter.
2) Local Bayesian safety analysis: Evaluating the expression
in (18) is still computationally intensive, which can limit the
practicality of this method for real-time validation of safety
guarantees in some applications, such as mobile robots relying
on on-board processing. An alternative is to replace the global
safety analysis with a local criterion that offers much faster
computation traded off with a weaker safety guarantee.
Instead of relying on Corollary 2, this lighter method
exploits Propositions 1 and 6. The system is allowed to explore
the computed safe set freely as long as the probability of
the estimated model Dˆ being locally reliable remains above
a certain threshold λ0; if this threshold is reached, the safe
controller intervenes, and the system is guaranteed to locally
maintain or increase the computed safety value V pxq with
probability no less than λ0. While this local guarantee does
not ensure safety globally, it does constitute a useful heuristic
effort to prevent the system from entering unexplored and po-
tentially unsafe regions of the state space. Further, although the
method is not explicitly tracking the hypotheses of Corollary 2,
the local result becomes a global guarantee if these hypotheses
do indeed hold.
We define the local safety confidence λpx;X, dˆjq, more
concisely λpxq, as the posterior probability that dpxq will be
contained in Dˆpxq at the current state x, given all observations
made until now:
λpx;X, dˆjq :“ P `dpxq P Dˆpxq | X, dˆj˘ (19)
We then have the following local safety certificate.
Proposition 7: Let the disturbance dp¨q be distributed
component-wise as nd independent Gaussian processes (9).
The safety policy κ˚p¨q is guaranteed to locally maintain or
increase the system’s computed safety V p¨q with probability
greater than or equal to the local safety confidence λpxq.
Proof: The proof follows directly from Propositions 1 and
6, and the definition of λpxq, noting that the boundary of
Dˆpxq has zero Lebesgue measure and thus under any Gaussian
distribution P pd P int Dˆpxq|d P Dˆpxqq “ 1.
A local confidence threshold λ0 P p0, pq can be established
such that whenever λpxq ă λ0 the model is considered
insufficiently reliable (reachability guarantees may fail locally
with probability greater than 1´λ0), and the safety control is
applied. The proposed safety control strategy is therefore as
follows:
κpxq “
#
κlpxq, if
`
V pxq ą 0˘^ `λpxq ą λ0˘,
κ˚pxq, otherwise, (20)
Similarly to (15), under this control law, if confidence on the
local reliability of the model is restored after applying the
safe action and making new observations, the system will be
allowed to resume its learning process, as long as it is in the
interior of the computed safe set.
After generating a new Gaussian process model and defining
Dˆpxq as described in Section IV-B, the prior probability
with which the disturbance function dpxq belongs to the set
Dˆpxq is by design p everywhere in the state space. As the
system evolves, more evidence is gathered in the form of
measurements of the disturbance along the system trajectory,
so that the belief that dpxq P Dˆpxq is updated for each x.
In particular, in the Gaussian process model, this additional
evidence amounts to augmenting the covariance matrix Kj in
(10) with additional data points and reevaluating the mean and
variance of the posterior distribution of dpxq. Based on the new
Gaussian distribution, λpx;X, dˆjq can readily be evaluated for
each x as
λpxq “
ndź
j“1
1
2
«
erf
˜
dj`pxq ´mjpxq
sjpxq?2
¸
´ erf
˜
dj´pxq ´mjpxq
sjpxq?2
¸ff
,
(21)
with dj`pxq “ d¯jpxq ` zσjpxq, dj´pxq “ d¯jpxq ´ zσjpxq,
mjpxq “ Erdjpxq|X, dˆjs, sjpxq “avarpdjpxq|Xq; recall
that z was defined to yield the desired probability mass p in
Dˆpxq at the time of safety computation, as per (13).
Parameters p and λ0 (or, in its case, γ0) allow the system
designer to choose the degree of conservativeness in the
system: while p regulates the amount of uncertainty accounted
for by the robust model-based safety computation, λ0 (γ0)
determines the acceptable degradation in the resulting cer-
tificate’s posterior confidence before a safety intervention is
initiated. A value of p close to 1 will lead to a large, high-
confidence Dˆpxq throughout the state space, but this analysis
may result in a small or even empty safe set; on the other
hand, if p is low, Dˆpxq will be smaller and the computed safe
set will be larger, but guarantees are more likely to be deemed
unreliable (as per λ0 or γ0) in light of later observations.
In the case of local safety analysis, immediately after
computing a new model Dˆ, λpxq is by construction equal
to p everywhere in the state space. As more measurements
are obtained, the posterior distribution over the disturbance
changes, as illustrated in Fig. 2, which can result in λpxq
locally increasing or decreasing. If λ0 is chosen to be close
to p, it is likely that the safety override will take place under
minor deviations with respect to the model’s prediction; as
λ0 becomes lower, however, the probability that the distur-
bance will violate the modeling assumptions before the safety
controller intervenes increases. This reflects the fundamental
tradeoff between risk and conservativeness in safety-critical
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safe learning framework, in our first setup we let the vehicle
begin its online learning in mid-air starting with a completely
untrained controller. The general functioning of the framework
can be observed in the second flight experiment, in which
the vehicle starts with a conservative model and iteratively
computes empirical estimates of the disturbance, gradually
expanding its computed safe set while avoiding overreliance
on poor predictions. Finally, we include an experiment in
which an unexpected disturbance is introduced into the system.
The vehicle reacts by immediately applying the safe action
dictated by its local safety policy and retracting from the
perturbed region, successfully maintaining safety throughout
its trajectory. We show how the absence of online guarantee
validation in the same scenario can result in loss of safety.
We use an affine dynamical model of quadrotor vertical
flight, with state equations:
9x1 “ x2
9x2 “ kTu` g ` k0 ` dpxq (22)
where x1 is the vehicle’s altitude, x2 is its vertical velocity,
and u P r0, 1s is the normalized motor thrust command. The
gravitational acceleration is g “ ´9.8 m/s2. The parameters
of the affine model kT and k0 are determined for the Pelican
and the Hummingbird vehicles through a simple on-the-ground
experimental procedure—a scale is used to measure the normal
force reduction for different values of u. The state constraint
K “ tx : 0 m ď x1 ď 2.8 mu encodes the position of the floor
and the ceiling, which must be avoided. Finally, d is an
unknown, state-dependent scalar disturbance term representing
unmodeled forces in the system. We learn dpxq using a Gaus-
sian process model, and generate Dˆpxq as the marginal 95%
confidence interval at each x. We implement local Bayesian
guarantee validation, conservatively approximating (21) by
assuming sjpxq :“avarpdjpxq|Xq «avarpdjpxq|Xoldq, that
is, neglecting the (favorable but often small) reduction in un-
certainty due to Xnew. This was done for ease of prototyping.
As the learning-based controller, we choose an easily
implementable policy gradient reinforcement learning algo-
rithm [28], which learns the weights for a linear mapping
from state features to control commands. Following [20], we
define different features for positive and negative velocities and
position errors, since the (unmodeled) rotor dynamics may be
different in ascending and descending flight. This can be seen
as the policy gradient algorithm learning the feedback gains
for a hybrid proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller.
A. From Fall to Flight
To demonstrate the strength of Hamilton-Jacobi-based guar-
antees for safely performing learning-based control on a phys-
ical system, we first require a Pelican quadrotor to learn an ef-
fective vertical trajectory tracking controller with an arbitrarily
poor initialization. To do this, the policy gradient algorithm is
initialized with all feature weights set to 0. The pre-computed
safety controller (numerically obtained using [31]) is based
on a conservative uncertainty bound of ˘1.5 m/s2 everywhere
in the state space; no new bounds are learned during this
experiment. The reference trajectory requires the quadrotor to
aggressively alternate between hovering at two altitudes, one
of them (1.5 m) near the center of the room, the other (0.1 m)
close to the floor.
This first experiment illustrates the interplay between the
learning controller and the safety policy. The iterative safety
re-computation and Bayesian guarantee validation compo-
nents of the framework are not active here. Consistently, this
demonstration uses (8) as the least-restrictive safe policy.
The experiment, shown in Fig. 3, is initialized with the
vehicle in mid-air. Since all feature weights are initially set to
zero, the vehicle’s initial action is to enter free fall. However,
as the quadrotor is accelerated by gravity towards the floor,
the boundary of the computed safe set is reached, triggering
the intervention of the safety controller, which automatically
overrides the learning controller and commands the maximum
available thrust to the motors (u “ 1), causing the vehicle
to decelerate and hover at a small distance from the ground.
For the next few seconds, there is some chattering near the
boundary of the safe set, and the policy gradient algorithm
has some occasions to attempt to control the vehicle when
it is momentarily pushed into the interior of the safe set.
Initially it has little success, which leads the safety controller
to continually intervene to prevent the quadrotor from colliding
with the floor; this has the undesirable effect of slowing down
the learning process, since observations under this interference
are uninformative about the behavior of the vehicle when
actually executing the commands produced by the learning
controller (which is an “on-policy” algorithm). However, at
approximately t “ 40 s, the learning controller is able
to make the vehicle ascend towards its tracking reference,
retaining control of the vehicle for a longer span of time and
accelerating the learning process. By t “ 60 s, the quadrotor is
approximately tracking the reference, with the safety controller
only intervening during the aggressive descent phase of the
repeated trajectory, to ensure (under its conservative model)
that there is no risk of a ground collision. The controller
continues to learn in subsequent iterations, overall improving
its tracking accuracy.
The remarkable result in this experiment is not in the
quality of the learned tracking controller after only a few
seconds of active exploration (a merit that corresponds to
the reinforcement learning method [28]), but the system’s
ability to achieve competent performance at its task from an
extremely poor initial policy while remaining safe at all times.
B. When in Doubt
In the second experiment, we demonstrate the iterative
updating of the safe set and safety policy using observations
of the system dynamics gathered over time, as well as the
online validation of the resulting guarantees. All components
of the framework are active during the test, namely learning
controller, safety policy, iterative safety re-computation, and
Bayesian guarantee validation, with the main focus being on
the latter two.
Here, the Pelican quadrotor attempts to safely track the
same reference trajectory, while using the gathered information
about the system’s evolution to refine its notion of safety. In
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show
n wi
th an
d wi
thout
onlin
e mo
del v
alida
tion.
After
the
fan i
s turn
ed on
, the
vehic
le ch
eckin
g loc
al mo
del r
eliab
ility
detec
ts the
incon
sisten
cy an
d ove
rride
s the
learn
ing c
ontro
ller,
avoid
ing t
he re
gion
with
unmo
deled
dyna
mics
; the
vehic
le
witho
ut m
odel
valid
ation
enter
s this
regio
n and
collid
es w
ith
the g
round
multi
ple ti
mes.
The b
ehavi
or is
repea
ted w
hen t
he
refer
ence
trajec
tory
enter
s the
pertu
rbed
regio
n a s
econ
d tim
e.
safet
y in m
ore g
enera
l con
dition
s, giv
en lim
ited c
ompu
tation
al
resou
rces
and a
vaila
ble k
nowl
edge
abou
t the
syste
m.
VI.
CON
CLU
SION
We h
ave i
ntrod
uced
a saf
e lea
rning
fram
ewor
k tha
t com
-
bines
robus
t reac
habil
ity g
uaran
tees
from
contr
ol th
eory
with
Baye
sian
analy
sis b
ased
on em
pirica
l obs
ervat
ions.
This
re-
sults
in a m
inima
lly re
strict
ive s
uperv
isory
contr
oller
that c
an
allow
an ar
bitrar
y lea
rning
algor
ithm
to sa
fely e
xplor
e its
state
and
strate
gy sp
aces.
As m
ore d
ata a
re ga
there
d on
line,
the
fram
ewor
k allo
ws th
e sys
tem t
o pro
babil
istica
lly re
ason
abou
t
the v
alidit
y of i
ts rob
ust m
odel-
based
safet
y gua
rante
es in
light
of th
e late
st em
pirica
l evid
ence.
We
firml
y be
lieve
that
provi
ding
stron
g an
d pr
actic
ally
usefu
l safe
ty gu
arant
ees fo
r syst
ems t
hat n
aviga
te un
struc
tured
envir
onme
nts re
quire
s a ra
pproc
heme
nt be
twee
n mo
del-b
ased
and d
ata-d
riven
techn
iques
, ofte
n reg
arded
as a
dicho
tomy
by
both
theor
eticia
ns an
d pra
ctitio
ners.
With
this w
ork w
e inte
nd
to pr
ovide
math
emat
ical
argum
ents
and
empi
rical
evide
nce
of th
e pot
entia
l tha
t the
two
appro
aches
hold
when
used
in
conju
nctio
n.
Scali
ng up
safet
y cer
tifica
tes a
s inte
lligen
t sys
tems
achie
ve
incre
asing
comp
lexity
poses
an im
porta
nt op
en re
searc
h pro
b-
lem.
Our
predi
ction
is th
at, as
auton
omou
s sys
tems
intera
ct
incre
asing
ly clo
sely
with
huma
n bei
ngs,
the g
racef
ul int
erpla
y
of sa
fety
and l
earni
ng, c
ombi
ning
theor
etica
l gua
rante
es w
ith
empi
rical
groun
ding,
will
beco
me c
entra
l to t
heir
succe
ss.
APPENDIX
Restricting one of the control inputs d to a state-dependent
bound Dˆpxq introduces questions as to whether a unique
Carathe´odory solution to (2) continues to exist. The basic
existence and uniqueness theorems [11] assume fixed control
sets. If the variation in the control sets can instead be expressed
through the dynamic equation itself without breaking the
continuity conditions, then it is easy to extend the classical
result to at least a class of space-dependent control sets. We
introduce two technical assumptions, which give sufficient
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a solution to
the dynamical equations, and prove that any disturbance set
Dˆpxq obtained from a Gaussian process model with Lipschitz
prior mean and covariance kernel satisfies these assumptions.
Assumption 1: For all x P Rn, Dˆpxq is a closed defor-
mation retract of D, that is, there exists a continuous map
Hx : D ˆ r0, 1s Ñ Dˆpxq such that for every d P D and
dˆ P Dˆpxq, Hxpd, 0q “ d, Hxpd, 1q P Dˆpxq, Hxpdˆ, 1q “ dˆ.
Assumption 2: Let r : Rn ˆ D Ñ D be such that
rpx, dq “ Hxpd, 1q as defined above. Then r is Lipschitz
continuous in x, and uniformly continuous in d.
Intuitively, the first assumption means that D can be con-
tinuously deformed into Dˆpxq for any x, while the second
prevents the disturbance bound Dˆpxq from changing abruptly
as one moves in the state space. The retraction map r allows
us to absorb the state-dependence of the disturbance bound
into the system dynamics, enabling us to use the standard
analysis for differential games, which considers measurable
time signals drawn from fixed input sets. This is formalized
in the following result.
Proposition 8: The saturated system dynamics
f˜Dˆpx, u, dq :“ f
`
x, u, rpx, dq˘ are bounded and uniformly
continuous in all variables, and Lipschitz in x.
Proof: Boundedness and uniform continuity of f˜Dˆ in u
are trivially inherited from f ; we therefore focus on d and x.
First, since r is uniformly continuous in d, and f is Lipschitz
(hence uniformly continuous) in its third argument, we have
by composition that f˜Dˆ is uniformly continuous in d.
Lipschitz continuity in x is less immediate due to its
appearance in both the first and third arguments of f . Again
by composition, Lipschitz continuity of r in x implies that
f
`
y, u, rp¨, dq˘ is also Lipschitz for all y P Rn, u P U and
d P D. Letting Lr be the Lipschitz constant of r and Lx be
the Lipschitz constant of f in its first argument, we have, for
any x, x˜ P Rn:
|fpx, u, rpx, dqq ´ fpx˜, u, rpx˜, dqq|
ď |fpx, u, rpx, dqq ´ fpx˜, u, rpx, dqq| ` |fpx˜, u, rpx, dqq ´ fpx˜, u, rpx˜, dqq|
ď pLx ` LdLrq|x´ x˜|
Thus f˜Dˆp¨, u, dq “ fp¨, u, rp¨, dqq is indeed Lipschitz in x.
Corollary 3: The dynamical system given by (2) with d
constrained to lie in a state-dependent set Dˆpxq satisfying
Assumptions 1 and 2 has a unique continuous solution in the
extended (Carathe´odory) sense.
The above result is important in that it guarantees existence
and uniqueness of system trajectories for any state-dependent
disturbance bound Dˆp¨q that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
Moreover, the above construction allows us to transform the
system dynamics fpx, u, dq with d P Dˆpxq into the standard
form with fixed input sets (i.e. f˜Dˆpx, u, dq with u P U , d P D),
so that all results from the differential games literature can
readily be applied to our formulation.
Let us now see that the posterior mean and standard
deviation of the components of dpxq are Lipschitz continuous
functions of the state x under our Gaussian process framework.
Proposition 9: Let the prior mean function µj be Lipschitz
continuous, and the covariance kernel kj be jointly Lipschitz
continuous, for the jth component of the disturbance function
dpxq. Then the posterior mean d¯jpxq and standard deviation
σjpxq, as given by (10), (11) are Lipschitz continuous in x.
Proof: The result follows from applying the hypotheses
to (10), (11). Note that the standard deviation σjpxq is the
square root of the variance in (11); the square root function
is Lipschitz everywhere except at 0, and Bayesian inference
under nondegenerate prior and likelihood never results in 0
posterior variance. Thus σjp¨q is also Lipschitz.
The following proposition relates the state-dependent bound
Dˆpxq obtained from Gaussian process regression to Assump-
tions 1 and 2, ensuring that the dynamical system (2) is well-
defined, and therefore the associated dynamic game be solved
using the methods presented in Section III.
Proposition 10: Let the prior mean function µj be Lipschitz
continuous, and the covariance kernel kj be jointly Lipschitz
continuous in its two variables, for all components j of the
disturbance function dpxq. Then the disturbance bound Dˆpxq,
as defined in (13), satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
Proof: Assumption 1 holds independently of the Lips-
chitz condition. The bound Dˆpxq given by (13) is a compact
convex set in D. As a result, the retraction map pix : D Ñ
Dˆpxq assigning every d P D its (unique) nearest point in Dˆpxq
is a Lipschitz continuous function (with Lipschitz constant
equal to 1); of course with pixpdˆq “ dˆ for all dˆ P Dˆpxq. Then,
the function Hxpd, tq :“ p1 ´ tqd ` tpixpdq is continuous by
composition and further satisfies Hxpd, 0q “ d,Hxpd, 1q P
Dˆpxq, Hxpdˆ, 1q “ dˆ for all d P D and dˆ P Dˆpxq.
Assumption 2 can be shown to hold by noting that the
extrema of each of the intervals in (13) are affine in d¯jpxq and
σjpxq, which are Lipschitz continuous in x by Proposition 9.
This implies that the position of all vertices of the hyperrect-
angle in (13) varies as a Lipschitz continuous function of x,
and so does, as a result, the nearest point in Dˆpxq to any fixed
d P D. The map rpx, dq “ pixpdq is hence Lipschitz continuous
in x. Finally, since pix is Lipschitz continuous in d, r is also
uniformly continuous in d.
Finally, we can show that, under the same Lipschitz assump-
tions on the Gaussian process prior, the disturbance bound
Dˆpxq is Lipschitz continuous under the Hausdorff distance,
which we required in Proposition 1.
Proposition 11: Let the prior mean function µj be Lipschitz
continuous, and the covariance kernel kj be jointly Lipschitz
continuous in its two variables, for all components j of the
disturbance function dpxq. Then the set-valued map Dˆ is
Lipschitz continuous under the Hausdorff distance.
Proof: Since the disturbance set Dˆpxq given by (13)
is a hyperrectangle, the Hausdorff distance between the dis-
turbance sets Dˆpx1q and Dˆpx2q is upper-bounded by the
maximum distance between any pair of corners:
δpx1, x2q :“ dH
`Dˆpx1q, Dˆpx2q˘ ď max
i
max
k
|ci ´ ck| ,
with ci,ck used to enumerate all corners of each of the
two hyperrectangles. For simplicity of exposition, we use the
equivalence of all norms in Rdn to upper-bound the above,
arbitrary norm in Rnd , by the infinity norm, up to a constant
factor m, which in combination with (13) gives:
δpx1, x2q ď m¨max
j
`|d¯jpx1q´d¯jpx2q|`|zσjpx1q´zσjpx2q|˘ .
Now, by Proposition 9, d¯jpxq and σjpxq are Lipschitz contin-
uous in x; let their respective constants be Ljµ and L
j
σ . We
then have
dH
`Dˆpx1q, Dˆpx2q˘ ď m ¨max
j
`
Ljµ ` zLjσ
˘|x1 ´ x2| ,
which proves Hausdorff Lipschitz continuity of the set-valued
map Dˆ, with a Lipschitz constant LDˆ upper bounded by
m ¨maxj Ljµ ` zLjσ .
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